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gunnery and the development of  
continuous-aim fire� He begins to  
innovate!
Sims forged the Navy in preparation 
for World War I with his focus on 
naval gunnery, battleship design, and 
destroyer operations� Always the rebel 
and revolutionary, his insights were 
grounded on firsthand knowledge and 
experience� Sims was a critical thinker 
whose ability to evaluate technologies 
and platform designs was matched by 
his determination to fight for those 
changes required for military readi-
ness� He abhorred risk-averse behavior 
and what he termed “military con-
servatism,” referring to the “danger-
ous reluctance to accept new ideas�”  
From Sims’s perspective, the opportu-
nity for officers to conduct war games 
served to enhance the development of 
critical thinking skills and innovative 
operational solutions� He would enjoy 
exploring advanced technologies, such 
as drones, networks of autonomous, 
unmanned systems, and artificial 
intelligence, and would integrate these 
technologies into military war-fighting 
capabilities� Sims would be the first 
to accept and adopt these technolo-
gies to gain a military advantage� 
As President of the Naval War College, 
Sims exemplified a career dedicated to 
the education and development of Navy 
leaders� Throughout his career, Sims 
emphasized the need for the develop-
ment of leaders with strong moral 
character, who were capable of strategic 
thinking and effective decision making�
Sims continues to inspire and challenge 
a new generation of Navy leaders� Sims 
would remind us that the main objec-
tive of the Navy is to prepare for war! He 
cautions us to be aware of our own fleet’s 
vulnerabilities and tasks us to remain 
vigilant with regard to maintaining 
military readiness� While I would not 
presume to know how he would handle 
each of the military crises in today’s mil-
itary operational environment, I would 
offer that Sims would applaud the Naval 
War College’s commitment to excellence 
in education and its commitment to de-
veloping revolutionary innovative naval 
warfare concepts through war gaming� 
In conclusion, Sims serves as a model 
for all leaders and challenges us to 
examine our personal and professional 
development� How do we compare in 
our dedication to duty, our commit-
ment to discipline and moral courage, 
our ability to innovate, and our ability 
to challenge ourselves continuously by 
learning? One could argue that we need 
a young Lieutenant Sims today if we are 
to remain a world power� The question 
is, Would we recognize a Lieutenant 
Sims in the twenty-first-century Navy? 
This is a welcome addition to the 21st 
Century Foundations series from the 
Naval Institute Press, informative, 
inspiring, and a must-read for those 
interested in leader development� The 
bibliography provides further read-
ing recommendations to enhance 
the reader’s interest in this topic�
YVONNE R� MASAKOWSKI
Kaiser, David� No End Save Victory: How FDR 
Led the Nation into War� New York: Basic Books, 
2014� 408pp� $28
David Kaiser’s No End Save Victory 
stands out as the best of several books 
published in 2014 that examine FDR’s 
leadership during the interlude between 
the fall of France and the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in December 
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1941� In contrast to Lynne Olson’s Those 
Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and 
America’s Fight over World War II, Susan 
Dunn’s 1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh, 
Hitler—the Election amid the Storm, 
and Nicholas Wapshott’s The Sphinx: 
Franklin Roosevelt, the Isolationists, 
and the Road to World War II, Kaiser 
extends his analysis beyond the domes-
tic struggle between Roosevelt and the 
isolationists� While his analysis includes 
discussions of congressional politics, 
neutrality legislation, the America First 
Committee, and the election of 1940, 
it encompasses additional dimensions 
that shaped FDR’s foreign and security 
policy ranging from the role of ULTRA 
and MAGIC intercepts to naval and 
military advice regarding capabilities 
and force development� Kaiser presents a 
wide-ranging analysis of policy, strat-
egy, capacity, and mobilization during a 
period when danger loomed but much 
of the public opposed direct military 
intervention in the ongoing conflicts 
in Europe, China, and the Atlantic� 
His cast of individuals and institutions 
includes not only the familiar top tier of 
figures and committees but the military 
planners, labor union bosses, business 
leaders, and second tier of executive 
officials who translated FDR’s visionary 
ideas into tangible plans and policies�
Kaiser is particularly skillful in three 
areas� Most strikingly, his narrative does 
a marvelous job of capturing the flavor 
of FDR’s decision making� While highly 
organized individuals such as Secretary 
of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief 
of Staff George Marshall could be  
driven to distraction by the president’s  
intuitive—sometimes meandering— 
approach to strategy and planning, the 
reader gains an understanding of what 
Roosevelt was doing� He was exploring 
and creating options� He was testing 
ideas and concepts, sometimes dropping 
them and sometimes merely pocketing 
them for later use at the appropriate 
time and place� Kaiser repeatedly points 
out how Roosevelt prodded subordinates 
to provide him feedback on various 
germinating concepts months and 
sometimes years before they became 
policy, with Lend-Lease, the destroyers-
for-bases deal, the occupation of Iceland 
and Greenland, and the oil embargo of 
Japan among the concepts he examined 
discreetly and informally well before he 
unveiled his intentions to cabinet mem-
bers, congressional leaders, and allies� 
Second, Kaiser makes clear that FDR 
was thinking in terms of victory over 
the Axis powers even while Marshall, 
Hap Arnold, and others remained 
focused on hemispheric defense and 
building up American forces in 1939 
and 1940� Even before the outbreak of 
war in Europe, Roosevelt grasped the 
importance of airpower, pushing for a 
huge air force “so that we do not need to 
have a huge army�” Likewise, the Two-
Ocean Navy Act passed in the summer 
of 1940, providing the U�S� Navy with 
the means to mount offensives in the 
Pacific even while supporting Anglo-
American amphibious assaults in the 
Mediterranean and France in 1943–44� 
Lastly, Kaiser takes on the latest genera-
tion of literature postulating that FDR 
sought to find a “back door to war” 
against Germany by implementing an oil 
embargo of Japan that he knew would 
provoke a Japanese military response� 
Kaiser weighs the evidence very care-
fully, and while he concludes that FDR 
was fully aware that implementing the 
embargo might lead to war with Japan, 
FDR was reacting to MAGIC intercepts 
that indicated that the Japanese occu-
pation of southern French Indochina 
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was designed to prepare the way for the 
conquest of Singapore and the Dutch 
East Indies� FDR, aware that Japan had 
plans for continued expansion, sim-
ply did not see why the United States 
should supply Japan with the means 
for its southward drive� Kaiser puts it 
as follows: “The American embargo 
did not lead the Japanese to decide on 
a southward advance� That decision 
had taken place before the American 
freeze of Japanese assets” (258)� 
Kaiser’s work is a must-read for those 
interested in strategy, policy, and 
the preparation for war� Kaiser rates 
Roosevelt’s performance very highly� 
While the book lacks a bibliography, 
the endnotes confirm that the work 
rests on a thorough use of both primary 
and secondary sources� Those seeking 
to understand how Roosevelt prepared 
the United States for a war he viewed as 
inevitable will find this book insight-
ful, delightful, and multilayered�
DOUGLAS PEIFER
Fisher, David� Morality and War: Can War Be Just 
in the Twenty-First Century? Oxford Univ� Press, 
2012� 320pp� $30 (paperback) 
David Fisher’s recent book, Morality and 
War, offers an account of the philosophi-
cal foundations of the just war tradition 
that integrates various contemporary 
forms of ethics into a new approach 
he calls “virtuous consequentialism�” 
He argues against moral skeptics and 
antifoundationalists, insisting that some 
account of the underpinnings of moral-
ity must be given if moral prescription 
is to maintain its normative force and 
not collapse into relativism� For Fisher, 
thinkers as diverse as Isaiah Berlin and 
Michael Walzer succumb to a false 
dichotomy; the impoverished moral 
vocabulary of the twentieth century 
forces them to oscillate between two 
extremes—an infallible totalitarian-
ism and a groundless liberalism� In this 
picture, any attempt to define what is 
required for all humans at all times and 
everywhere to flourish is seen as the 
attempt to subjugate one’s own choices 
to an irrationally inerrant worldview, 
which in the postmodern age is criti-
cized as feigning objectivity for the 
interests of prevailing power structures� 
Countering this, Fisher adopts an 
Aristotelian approach to moral theory� 
Aristotle’s teleology allowed him to 
understand the life of virtue as both 
necessary for all human flourishing 
and pluralistic in its manifold expres-
sion� Both the athlete and the artisan 
might flourish as human beings just 
so long as they possess the virtues, 
even if it is understood that courage, 
justice, and the rest are expressed in 
very different ways between the two; 
and a soldier’s courage is the same even 
when comparisons are made between 
drastically different times and places� 
Yet despite this endorsement of Ar-
istotle, Fisher believes that no single 
moral theory—Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
utilitarianism, deontology—adequately 
accounts for the complexity of our 
contemporary moral lives� Therefore, 
his project combines consequential-
ism with virtue ethics because he sees 
each as having something the other 
requires to make sense of contemporary 
morality� Fisher argues that to know 
what the right thing to do might be in 
a given situation we must reflect on 
how our actions conduce to human 
flourishing but also understand our 
actions’ consequences� That is, virtue 
NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb   124 8/13/15   3:06 PM
3
Peifer and Kaiser: No End Save Victory: How FDR Led the Nation into War
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
